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Abstract:  
In this paper, we apply an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model with endogenous fertility 
and a pay as you go (PAYG) pension system to find out what are the economic consequences 
of different policy measures to increase the number of children. Especially, we take into 
account the introduction of a child dependent PAYG pension system, child allowances 
financed by a labor income tax, and a reduction of the child rearing costs. Some authors have 
shown that in small open economies with exogenous growth it is possible to increase the 
fertility without harming any generation. Here we show that this is impossible in a model 
with endogenous growth. 
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1- Introduction 
In most developed countries, we observe that the fertility rate is insufficient to keep 
the population constant. This leads to an ageing of the society, which causes in the view of 
the governments and economists many problems with respect to the health care system, the 
pension system, the labor market and rural areas. Especially, they fear that the pension 
systems will become unsustainable in the next 30 to 50 years. Many economists argue that 
the mostly existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems should be abolished and 
substituted by a capital funded pension system. However, the problem is that a transition 
from a PAYG system to a capital funded pension system will imply a double burden for one 
generation or more generations; some generations have to save for their pension and to 
finance the pensions of the living retired generation. It seems to be politically difficult to 
enforce as well as to justify such a transition. Therefore, governments would like to 
implement policy measures to increase the fertility rate so that the number of citizens will be 
at minimum constant. Here, we take it as given that it is a political desire to increase the 
fertility rate. Additionally, we take a PAYG pension system as granted. We make this 
assumption because in most countries exists a form of this pension scheme. In a standard 
OLG model without endogenous growth suchlike policy measures exist for small open 
economies, as it was shown by Abio et al. (2004), Kolmar (1997), Fenge and Meier (2005, 
2009), van Groezen et al. (2003). These measures are applied in some form in most European 
countries. In this paper, we want to investigate, if these results also hold in an endogenous 
growth model.  
 We use widely well-accepted assumptions from the literature to analyze three kinds of 
policy options to increase the fertility. The first two are to lower the child rearing costs, and 
the third is to change the pension system in a way that the pensions of parents depend on the 
number of their children. On the producer side of the economy, we use an AK-production 
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function of the Romer-type instead of a standard neoclassical production function. On the 
consumer side, we use a standard OLG model of the Samuelson (1958) with endogenous 
population growth without any altruism. Then we will compare all three policy options with 
respect to the induced welfare effects.  
The paper is divided into 7 sections. In section 2, we give an overview of the fertility 
behavior in some countries. In section 3, we introduce the basic model and derive the 
equilibrium values. In section 4, we will introduce a tax-child allowance mechanism, and we 
will derive the influence of it on the equilibrium values. In section 5, we will do the same 
with the introduction of a child factor into the PAYG pension system. In section 6, we will 
compare the measures, and we will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a PAYG 
pension system and capital-funded pension system in general. In section 7, we will conclude 
our results.  
 
2- Some facts about fertility behavior1 
 In all developed countries, we observe that the total fertility rates are below their 
sustainable level, which would be theoretically two children per female on average. In 94 
countries, the total fertility rate is below two children per female. Surprisingly, the lowest 
fertility rates will be observed in developed Asian countries, Macau (0.92 children/female), 
Hong Kong (1.07), Singapore (1.11), Taiwan (1.15), Japan (1.21) and South Korea (1.23). 
One obvious reason for this could be that these countries have the highest population 
densities related to the rest of the world. According to the United Nations (2005) Macau has 
the highest population density (18,534 persons per square kilometer) worldwide, ranked third 
is Singapore (7,148) followed by Hong Kong (6,349). Also, the territorial Asian states are 
ranked very high; Taiwan (639) is ranked 16, South Korea (487) 23 and Japan (337) is ranked 
                                                 
1
  The numbers in this section are taken from the CIA World Fact Book 2012, if not otherwise noted.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html  
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38 in the world. Without any doubt, this characteristic leads to relative high housing costs and 
therefore indirectly to relative high child rearing costs, because children need space. However, 
this could not the only reason for the low fertility rate, for example, the Netherlands has a 
population density of 403 persons per square kilometer with the rank 30 worldwide, but the 
total fertility amounts to 1.98 children per female. In Asian countries, it is also a fact, that the 
overall expenditures for education are relative high, however in addition the private 
expenditures are very high, where the latter costs increase the individual child rearing costs. 
According to the OECD2, Korean parents spend 2.8% of the GDP for the education of their 
children; these are the relative highest private expenditures in the OECD, in Japan the parents 
spend 1.7% of the GDP for education, only the relative private expenditures for education in 
Korea, the USA (2.1%) and Chile (2.7%) are higher in the OECD. On the other hand, the 
explicit relative total expenditures for pre-primary education are low in Japan and Korea. 
The relative total expenditures for pre-primary education are the second-lowest in 
Korea (0.18% of GDP) and the third lowest in Japan (0.21%) in the OECD. Only Australia 
spends less with 0.08% of the GDP. This leads to low female labor market participation rates 
in these countries and high implicit child-rearing costs. In some sense, the choice of parents 
how much they invest in the education of their children is restricted by Asian culture and 
habit, and these costs must be interpreted as given by the society. It seems to be that Asian 
parents’ willingness to pay for the education of their offspring is much higher than in non-
Asian OECD countries. Additionally, Asian educational systems usually initiate winner-take-
all competitions to measure the relative success of the students, which also increase 
tendentially the private expenditures for education.3  
                                                 
2
  See OECD (2011). 
3
  See regarding winner take all contests Frank and Cook (1995).  
The Costs of Increasing the Fertility Rate in an Endogenous Growth Model 
5 
 
Additionally, both countries have a kind of a PAYG pension system, which also 
decreases the fertility rate.4 
 
3- The basic model of endogenous growth and endogenous fertility  
 We assume a closed economy, with only one good, which can be consumed or 
invested. Let us assume that the production is given by a simple AK production function, as 
Romer (1986), Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1991), Frankel (1962) introduced it. In the literature 
on endogenous growth and fertility this function was, for example, used by Wigger (1999), 
Saint-Paul (1992), Zhang & Zhang (1995, 1998, 2001), Zaigui (2007, 2005), Stauvermann 
(1996). 
  , , 	
  .          (1) 
The variable  represents the production, the technology parameter A is positive,  is the 
capital stock,   the labor force and 	
  the economy wide capital intensity, which is 
exogenous for an individual firm. The subscript t indicates period t.  Following Stauvermann 
(1997, 2002) we are able to derive the interest factor  and the wage rate ;  
             (2) 
and 
  1  	.           (3) 
The parameter  lies between zero and one. It is assumed without a loss of generality that the 
depreciation rate of capital per period is one.  
The utility of a representative individual is given by the following log-linear utility 
function, which is commonly used in OLG-models;5 
        ln ",         (4) 
                                                 
4
  See Shinkawa (2005) for Japan and Kim & Kim (2005) for Korea.  
5
  See for example Varvarigos & Zakaria (2010), Wigger (1999), Yang (2005, 2007) or Fanti & Gori (2008, 
2010a, 2010b).   
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The utility  depends on the consumption in the first period of life , the consumption in 
the second period of life  , and the number of children "  1   . The parameter q 
represents the individual discount factor, where 0 $  % 1. The positive parameter v reflects 
the preference to get descendants. The budget constraint is given by:  
  &'()
*
+'()  1  ,  -" 
.'()
+'()  0,         (5) 
where  
/  01'()2'3'2'  ,"4.         (6) 
The variable 4  is interpreted as the per-capita growth factor of the wage rate or labor 
productivity. The parameter d is the fixed contribution rate of the pension system, the 
parameter b times the wage rate represents the costs to rear a quality-child. This means 
parents want only to raise a child with a certain level of well-being and education. The level 
of the well-being and education is often a result of societal developments, which are 
influenced by culture and history. Additionally, these levels are taken as given by the parents. 
The assumption here is similar to the specification of Srinivasan (1995), van Groezen et al 
(2003), Wigger (1999) and Fenge & Meier (2005, 2009).  
 Using the utility function (4) and the budget constraint (5), we get the following 
Lagrangian function, which we will maximize:  
,  , 5  ln   ln   ln 1    5 6  &'()
*
+'()  1  ,  -" 
.'()
+'()7. 
The resulting first order conditions are:    

&')  5  0,            (7) 
8
&'()* 
9
+'()  0,           (8) 
:
;'  5-  0,          (9) 
  &'()
*
+'()  1  ,  -" 
.'()
+'()  0.        (10) 
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From (7) and (8) we get;  
  ,           (11) 
and from (7) and (9); 
"  :&'
)
<1'.            (12) 
Substitute equations (11) and (12) in (13); and after some simple reformulations, we get for 
the consumption in the first period of life:  
 
=01'>'()?'()
8: .            (13)  
Therefore, the consumption in the second period of life is given by: 
  8=01'+'().'()8: .          (14) 
And finally the fertility factor " becomes to:  
" 
:@=01'>'()?'()A
8:<1' .          (15) 
In the next step we take into account the capital market equilibrium condition 
B  , where we use equations (13) and (14). We know that aggregate savings B are 
given by the difference between the aggregate wage sum minus the aggregate consumption of 
the young generation, the child rearing costs and contributions to the pension system. After 
some reformulation by using equations (2) and (3), we get the fertility factor:  
"  :C'0DE=0DE<8: F 0         (16) 
 The variable G is the growth factor of the economy, where G  "4. Given this and 
the capital market equilibrium condition, we are able to calculate the growth factor of the 
capital stock:   
GH  I'()I' 
D8E=D=0
D8:0:=D.         (17) 
Substituting (17) into (16) delivers the number of children in the equilibrium: 
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"H  :D0=D==D0
*
<D8:0:=D.        (18) 
As a result, the per-capita growth factor of capital, the wage rate and consumption in both 
periods are given by: 
4H  C'
H
;'H 
D<8E=D
:D=00.         (19) 
Now, we determined all relevant variables of this simple growth model. One 
important feature of the model is that the growth rate of the economy is only influenced by 
the contribution rate of the pension scheme d, the preference parameters v and q and the 
distributional parameter . Before we begin with analysis, we should note that a decrease of 
the per capita growth factor always imply a decrease of the welfare in the long run. Therefore, 
it is not necessary to derive explicit reactions of the utility function.   
If the contribution rate , increases, the following results can be expected: 
JC'H
J0  
D8E=DD8:
D8:0:=D* $ 0,        (20) 
J;'H
J0  
:K0=D<D8:0:=DD0=D==D0*<:=DL
6<D8:0:=D7*
$ 0,  (21) 
JM'H
J0  
D<8E=D*
N:D=00O* $ 0.                      (22) 
If the contribution rate increases, all growth variables will decrease, because of the 
lower disposal income, which will decrease the number of children and the savings. This 
result is not very surprising and well known in the literature. If the pension system is 
introduced, the resulting equilibrium is not dynamically efficient, because of the positive 
externality induced by the capital accumulation. A Pareto improvement is possible.6 However, 
if we would increase the welfare, a side effect would be a reduction of the number of children. 
The reason is that a Pareto improvement is only possible if the savings will increase. 
                                                 
6
  A Pareto improvement can be realized by taxing the young and this tax revenue must be saved and it must 
realize an interest factor which exceeds  (Stauvermann, 1996). Please note we only take the utility of 
individuals into account, which will be indeed be born. 
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Nevertheless, this causes a decline of the fertility factor. However, the objective here is to 
increase the number of children. The simplest way to do it is to lower the child rearing costs. 
Of course, that would mean that the actual educational system is inefficient. For example, it 
can be argued that day-care centers, pre-kindergarten, and kindergarten have a comparative 
cost advantage compared to home-based child care of every mother. As noted above this 
educational sector is, despite the relative huge aggregate educational expenditures in Korea 
and Japan, less developed in these countries. Even that many parents assume that a collective 
education in day-care centers, pre-kindergartens, and kindergartens is a disadvantage for 
children; Havnets, Tarjei, & Mogstad (2011) have shown in a remarkable study that this is 
not the case. However, the results are the following. By differentiation of equations (17), (18), 
and (19) with respect to the child-rearing costs b we get the following results.   
 
JM'H
J< 
D=D8E
:D=00 P 0.              (23) 
J;'H
J<  
:=00D=0
<*D8:0:=D $ 0.       (24) 
JC'H
J<  0.           (25) 
If the child-rearing costs increase, the number of children will decrease, because of 
the higher opportunity costs of children. As a result, the per-capita growth rate will increase, 
because of the lower number of children. The effect on the aggregate growth rate is zero. This 
means that the parents keep the aggregate expenditures for children -" constant. This effect 
is a consequence of the additive separability of the utility function.  
Proposition 1: An increase in the child rearing costs will lead to an increase of the per-capita 
growth rates and a decrease of the fertility.  
On the other hand, that means if the child rearing costs can be lowered, then the later 
born generations are worse off, because their wages will decrease, even that the future 
production will grow with an unchanged rate, but it must be shared by more persons.   
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4- A tax-child allowance mechanism  
Some governments introduced a subsidy for rearing children, or sometimes it is also 
called child allowance or family allowance. The similar mechanism was analyzed by van 
Groezen, et al. (2003), and Fenge and Meier (2005, 2009) and Wigger (1999), but their 
models differ from our approach. However, because  Groezen et al. (2003) and Fenge and 
Meier (2005, 2009) use a model without endogenous growth, they applied a lump sum tax 
and lump sum subsidy.  
The aim of this policy is to increase the number of children. Here, the expenditures 
will be financed by a labor income tax. We assume that the government taxes the wages with 
the tax rate Q and pay a subsidy of R- per child, where 0<m<1. The resulting government 
constraint is then Q  R-" or simplified:  
Q  R-"            (26)  
After substituting (26), the new budget constraint will be: 
  &'()
*
+'()  1  ,  Q  -1  R" 
.'()
+'()  0.     (27) 
Using this budget restriction, the first order condition (12) will change to;  
:
;'  5-1  R  0.          (28) 
The first order condition (10) will change to (27). If we now repeat the procedures 
from section 3, we get the following results for the growth variables:  
 GS  D8E=D=0=TD:=T=08=T0:=T.        (29) 
"S  :=0=0D0<:=TD=008=T.        (30) 
4S  D<8E=D=T:D=00  .          (31)  
Now, we can differentiate (31), (32) and (33) with respect to child allowance m.  
JC'U
JT  
D8E=D=0=0D0
KD:=T=08=T0:=TL* $ 0.      (32) 
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J;'U
JT 
:D80=D6=00D=0*7
<:=TD=008=T* P 0.       (33) 
JM'U
JT  
D<8E=D
:D=00 $ 0.          (34) 
The outcome of an increase or introduction of such a child allowance, financed by a labor 
income tax, will lead to a higher fertility rate, but it will lower the growth rate of the national 
income and the national income per capita.   
Proposition 2: The aggregate and per-capita growth rate will decrease if a child allowance 
and the corresponding labor income tax increase. However, the number of children will 
increase.  
The child rearing costs will decrease, and this induces the parents to get more children. 
The aggregate growth rate decreases, because the tax reduces the disposal income and this 
leads to a decrease of the savings, on the one hand. On the other hand, the per-capita growth 
will decline because of the decreased savings, and the increased number of children. 
 
5- The child factor 
A third possibility to increase the number of children is to introduce a child factor in the 
existing PAYG pension scheme. That means a part of the pension of parents depends directly 
on the number of children. Fenge & Meier (2005, 2009) introduced this mechanism.  
This means equation (7) has to be changed to /  /V  /& . The first part of the 
pension is the usual pension /V , which follows the rule: 
/V  1  W 01'()2';'2'  1  W,"4,       (35) 
where 0 % W % 1 holds (W is the child factor), and the children dependent part of the pension 
/&  follows the rule: 
"/&  W" 01'()2'2'  W",4.        (36) 
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From the view of parents, the wage rate in the following period is given; they know only, that 
they can increase their pension by increasing the number of children. This pension reform 
leads to a new budget restriction: 
   &'()
*
+'()  1  ,  -" 
.'()X ;'.'()Y
+'()  0.      (37) 
If we now maximize the utility function (4) with respect to the budget constraint (37), only 
the first order conditions (12) and (13) will change. Equation (13) must be substituted by (37) 
and instead of first order condition (9) we get: 
:
;'  5 6- 
Z01'M'
+'() 7  0.         (38) 
After some calculations, we will get the results for the growth variables: 
G&  =D=08DED:80:8Z=D.        (39) 
"&  =0N=D:8Z0D:O<N=D:8ZD:8O.        (40) 
4&  =D8<DED:0:8Z=D.          (41) 
Now, we can differentiate these three equations with respect to the share h: 
JC'Y
JZ  
=D*=08*D0E
ND:80:8Z=DO* $ 0.       (42) 
J;'Y
JZ 
=0=D08N=8=0D0O
<N=D:8ZD:8O* P 0.       (43) 
JM'Y
JZ  
=D*8*0<DE
ND:0:8Z=DO*<0.        (44) 
Proposition 3: The introduction of a child factor in the existing PAYG pension system 
increases the number of children and decreases the per-capita growth rates and the aggregate 
growth rates in an endogenous growth model.  
If a part of the pension is dependent on the number of children, the parents have an 
incentive to get more of them. This induces higher expenditures for child-rearing and results 
in a reduction of savings. Both effects, the higher number of children and the lower savings 
The Costs of Increasing the Fertility Rate in an Endogenous Growth Model 
13 
 
leads to a decrease of the per-capita growth rate, and the reduced savings lowers the 
aggregate growth rate. However, in the next section, we compare both policy measures.  
 
6- A comparison  
To compare the tax-child allowance policy from section 4 and the child factor policy from 
section 5 we determine the policy parameters so that the population will become sustainable, 
which means the population will become constant. We start with the tax-child allowance 
mechanism. Solving equation (30) for m so that "  1 gives: 
R1  :D=00=0=<=<D=0=80=<ND8=00O .        (45) 
Substituting (45) into the growth rate (31) leads to the corresponding equilibrium growth 
factor: 
4S1  D8E=D=0=<ND8=00O .         (46) 
At next, we calculate the values for the child-factor mechanism. Now we calculate the 
h, so that also with child factor policy "  1 holds. Using equation (40) we get for h: 
W1  <D=0=80=:D=00=0=<08=D=0=< .         (47) 
Substituting W1 in the equation (41), leads to the corresponding per-capita growth factor: 
 4&1  D8E=D=0=<ND8=00O .         (48) 
If we compare now equation (46) with (48), then we see that they are equal, this leads to the 
conclusion that both mechanisms deliver the same results with respect to the per-capita 
growth rate. Because of the fact that the population growth rate equals zero, then the 
aggregate growth rate and the savings will be changed in the same way by both mechanisms. 
Consequently, the negative welfare effects are also identical. In so far policy makers are free 
to choose between both mechanisms. However, now it is clear, that all policy measures, which 
increase the fertility have strong negative impacts for growth and hence the welfare.  
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Proposition 4: The child factor mechanism and tax subsidy mechanism have identical 
negative effects on the growth rates, if the number of children is given.  
However, one implication should be clear, in this model both mechanisms will lead to 
welfare losses. The simple reason is, if the per-capita growth rates decrease the utility of 
subsequent generations will also decrease.  
 Nevertheless, some forms of both mechanisms were introduced in Germany and they 
are still in use. The effect on the fertility is positive but nearly zero. But the mechanisms are 
very costly, in 2010 the German government paid on average around EUR 7,250 (approx. 
$ 10,000) per child and year for mechanisms which correspond with the mechanisms above. 
These costs exclude all expenditures for schools, kindergartens and universities.7       
 Because of the fact that similar mechanisms have been applied by Fenge & Meier 
(2005, 2009) and van Groezen, Leers & Meijdam (2003) in a small open economy with a 
neoclassical standard production function, we should compare our results with theirs. They 
come to the conclusion that both mechanisms can be welfare-enhancing. However, they took 
a small open economy into account. However, implicitly the financial means to finance the 
introduction of the proposed mechanisms in their models are borrowed from abroad. This 
leads then to an increasing current account deficit, which must be seen as problematic. 
 
7- Conclusion 
One general result is that the tax subsidy mechanism or child allowances are a perfect 
substitute to a child dependent PAYG pension system. Even that both mechanisms increase 
the fertility rate, it must be stated that the aggregate growth rate of production and the per 
capita growth rates will decrease as a consequence. Even if we would analyze an open 
                                                 
7
  Authors’ calculations, which are based on official numbers from the government. According to the actual 
government of Germany, parents bear only 25% of the total child rearing and educational costs.   
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economy in the way Wigger and Irmen (2006) have done it, the results would only change 
quantitatively but not qualitatively.  
However, one main reason, why governments of countries with a PAYG pension 
system think that they should fight against a demographic change is caused by the 
expectation that a worse ratio between the working and retired population makes it 
impossible to finance suitable pensions, without burdening the working population over 
proportionally. However, it is a political decision what suitable means, but according to our 
model, the pensions will increase with the aggregate growth rate as long as the fertility rate 
falls not to zero, even that the ration between average pension payment and average labor 
income will decrease. The fear that a PAYG pension system will collapse is not justified and 
nobody knows if the population will not stabilize in the future. Anyway, governments should 
be very careful before they introduce one of the proposed mechanisms to increase the 
fertility, because the costs of these mechanisms could be much higher than to increase 
slightly the contribution rate by a few per cent.  
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